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ACCOUNTING FOR EMISSION RIGHTS: AN
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS APPROACH
Emma Zhang-Debreceny,
Mary A Kaidonis, and
Lee Moerman
School of Accounting and Finance,
University of Wollongong, Wollongong,
Australia.

whereby a central authority transforms GHG,
of which „carbon‟ is one, into a new tradable
commodity (Andrew, 2008). It is assumed
that the value of carbon pollution can be
arrived at by trading emission rights that is,
trading in the “right to emit pollutants”
(IASB 2008a, para5).

ABSTRACT
We argue that the International Accounting
Standard Board‟s difficulty in arriving at a
standard for accounting for emission rights,
which is central to Emission Trading
Schemes, is an opportunity to re-examine the
issues from an environmental ethics
approach. We critically evaluate the IASB
approach which privileges profits, and views
emission rights as tradeable entitlements to
pollute. We consider social ecology, an
example of an environmental ethical
perspective which holds that humans‟
survival and the environment‟s sustainability
are inextricably linked. We conclude that
social ecology can inform accounting
standard setters about the accounting
treatment of emissions rights.

Solomon and Lee (2000, p. 35) described
ETS as a market means of “internalizing
externalities”. Traditionally the cost of
pollution is considered an externality and
thus is excluded from production costs. By
giving carbon pollution a „price tag‟, it is
assumed that entities would be given an
economic incentive to reduce carbon
pollution in order to avoid the additional
financial burden of having to purchase
emission rights to cover actual emissions.
In order that ETS succeed in reducing overall
emissions, there needs to be a limited supply
of emission rights, and as a scarce resource
the market is meant to determine the most
efficient price of emission rights (Andrew,
2008). Price would influence whether it is
more efficient for a firm to adopt carbon
friendly technology rather than keeping the
same polluting technology and buy emission
rights. Blass (2006) argued that by allowing
participants of an ETS to buy or sell emission
rights it would mean that the Kyoto target
could be achieved by the most cost efficient
means. For entities that are unable to meet
the emissions reduction target, they would
have to purchase additional emission rights
from „cleaner‟ entities, and/or a central
authority and/or a „greener‟ country in order
to cover their actual emissions level. While a
central authority sets the maximum allowable
carbon emissions quantity, the market
mechanism is used to trade in permits and
therefore will drive the price of emissions
rights (Blass, 2006, Andrew, 2008).

1. INTRODUCTION
Climate change presents challenges for all
stakeholders - individuals, policy makers,
industries, and the eco-system (IPCC 2008).
In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was released as
an international response to climate change,
whereby industrialised countries agreed to
reduce Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions
“by 8% between 2008 and 2012, in relation
to 1990 levels” (Blass, 2006, p. 30). The
challenges and responses to climate change
also provide an opportunity to engage in
ethical approaches to the environment, not
only by immediate stakeholders but by
accounting standard setters.
The dominant response of industrialised
countries to abate GHG has been to apply
market mechanisms (Lohmann 2009,
MacKenzie 2009).
Emissions Trading
Schemes (ETS) provide a market mechanism

Despite the fact that ETS have been in
operation for about 4 years, according to the
World Bank they were estimated to be worth
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around “£15billion in 2007” worldwide
(PricewaterhouseCoopers,
2008,
p.18).
Companies participating in ETS need to
reflect this impact in their financial reports.
Accordingly, the international accounting
profession, through its standard setting
guidelines, is required to engage with this
new mechanism for carbon abatement. While
it is the notion of a „carbon pollution cap‟
that is expected to set the goal of emissions
reduction, it is the cost of emission rights that
is expected to change business behaviour in
order to deliver emissions reduction
(Andrew, 2008). The need to internalise costs
of pollution or trade in emission permits, has
the effect of shifting what was traditionally
an external and costless concept into a costly
activity and, hence, is “at the heart of the
challenge to standard setters” (Cook, 2009, p.
457). The environmental crusader Gore
(2007) urged:
a re-examination of accounting
systems and measurement protocols to
include the environment in the routine,
everyday calculations by which our
economy is governed.
This paper re-examines accounting for
emissions rights in a way that is appropriate
to address our ecological crisis.

2. BACKGROUND
Global ETS participants continue to await
comprehensive and clear guidance from the
International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB). The IASB‟s efforts to develop.
comprehensive guidance on accounting for
emission rights have already been extremely
challenging. The IASB‟s International
Financial
Reporting
Interpretations
Committee (IFRIC) issued IFRIC 3 Emission
Rights as “an appropriate interpretation of
existing IFRSs for accounting for the EU
Scheme” (IASB 2005). Despite the
subsequent withdrawal of IFRIC 3, the IASB
continues to have accounting for ETS on its
board agenda (IASB, 2007; IASB 2008a;
IASB 2008b). According to IFRIC 3 and
consistent with the IASB Framework,
emission rights are recognised as assets. The
question remains: can this recognition
adequately capture the „nature‟ of emissions
rights and still be consistent with the Kyoto
protocol?
IFRIC 3 was withdrawn because it “creates
unsatisfactory measurement and reporting
mismatches” (IASB 2005). Therefore,
companies were also concerned that the
application of IFRIC 3 would force them to
show a “distorted picture of their
performance” (Cook, 2009, p. 457). This
delay in implementing comprehensive and
clear guidelines on accounting for emission
rights from the IASB provides an opportunity
to reconsider the basis upon which earlier
attempts to arrive at an accounting standard
rest. This paper focuses on the recognition
issue rather than the measurement issue in
relation to emission rights. The IASB (2008)
has identified that, apart from the
measurement issue, there are other
fundamental issues that need to be
appropriately addressed first. For example,
what is the nature of an emission right? Is an
emission right an asset? How should an
emission right be recognised initially,
particularly if a reporting entity receives it
from a government as a grant or free of
charge? Should a liability be recognised?
Without resolving the nature of emission
rights, accounting standard setters would not

In this paper we will first demonstrate that
efforts to recognise emission rights, so far,
have been dominated by mainstream
accounting approaches. We critically
evaluate the proposed mainstream accounting
approach in order to open further discussion
about accounting for emission rights. We
highlight the implication of accounting for
emission rights from an environmental ethics
perspective. In particular we consider social
ecology as an example of an environmental
ethics approach and use this to re-examine
the „nature‟ of emission rights. We conclude
that a social ecology view, an approach of
environment ethics, offers insights into why
accounting for emissions rights as assets or
liabilities would undermine efforts to reduce
GHG emissions.
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be able to decide what attributes of an
emission right they are trying to represent
and ultimately to measure. In the next
section, the notion of environmental ethics
will be introduced to help shed light on how
the „nature‟ or „essence‟ of emission rights
can be re-examined.
3.
MAINSTREAM
ENVIRONMENTAL
SOCIAL ECOLOGY

consider them as inextricably linked to the
ecological crisis.
In bringing to the forefront the imperative to
mitigate climate change we are then able to
identify that there is a serious moral
dilemma, rather than a mere technical
challenge. Zimmerman (1994, p. 3) argued
that:
…ecological problems cannot be
solved by simply tinkering with the
attitudes and practices that generated
those problems.
Environmental ethics offers another context
within which to consider accounting for
emission rights.

APPROACHES,
ETHICS
AND

3.1 Mainstream Approaches
The importance of understanding emissions
rights in the context of the environment is not
merely a technical issue of recognition or
measurement. There are fundamental issues
at stake which are reflected in the questions
Hopwood (2009, p. 435) raises, namely:
…can the ethical considerations of
environmentalists be transferred to the
economic market place? Or will the
values of the market place overwhelm
those of the environmental sphere,
introducing a totally new set of
unanticipated
consequences
and
actions which are likely to be to the
longer term detriment of the original
concerns?

3.2 Environmental Ethics
Environmental ethics “examines how human
beings should interact with the non-human
world around them” (Palmer, 1997, p. 6). As
a theoretical framework, environmental
ethics “develops, suggests and analyses ways
out of an environmental crisis” (Andrew,
2000, p. 197). In this paper we argue that
social ecology, an approach of environmental
ethics (Andrew, 2000) can be applicable to
the re-conceptualisation of emission rights.
As defined by Light (1998), social ecology
posits that there is a relationship between
society and the eco-system which can be
investigated. Inspired by Marx‟s work on
social hierarchy and class domination in a
capitalist society, proponents of social
ecology recognise the continuities between
the natural world and human society, and
their possible synthesis (Bookchin, 1980,
Callicott and Frodeman, 2009). The
ontological foundation of social ecology
recognises that the exploitation of nature not
only destroys the intrinsic value of ecosystems, but also the life line essential for
human survival (Light 1998). Social
ecologists see actions addressing ecology as
social (Light, 1998; Bookchin, 1989).
Accordingly, humans are deemed to have an
obligation to preserve nature as it is also a
part of the preservation and survival of
human-kind (Bookchin, 1980; 1989; 1990).
The inextricable link between humans and

If emissions rights are seen as private
property, then they possess the fundamental
characteristics of assets with economic
benefits, controllability and tradability.
However, is the essential nature of emission
rights adequately reflected if they are
recognised as assets? The challenge to the
IASB is not surprising considering that the
IASB views the issue of emission rights as a
technical one. The body has proposed a
traditional, mainstream approach to provide
answers. Mainstream approaches have
considered ethical issues as non-technical
and hence these have remained outside the
IASB‟s domain. The IASB‟s approach is
most evident when accounting standard
setters see emission rights as something
merely upon which the right „price tag‟ must
be assigned. It is at this point that we can
pause to reconsider another way to
conceptualise emission permits and to
21

the environment was also stressed by Geno
(1995, p. 176):
…if human societies are to come to
grips with their relationship to, and
interdependence on, natural capital in
the form of indispensable resources for
survival,
institutions
such
as
accounting and economics must face
the moral as well as technical
challenges
in
accounting
for
sustainability.
Social ecology is consistent with the view
that human potentialities can shape the
future, and need to be brought to the
forefront of humans‟ action (Bookchin,
1980).

argued that accounting for ecology should
take into account environmental externalities
to ensure that economic growth does not go
beyond the carrying capacity of an ecosystem. Social ecology adopts an open and
inclusive approach and can enable the
integration of the environment into the
“social realm and not divorced” from it
(Gallhofer and Haslam, 1997, p. 163).
Consistent with social ecology, Eckersley
(1998, p.169) pointed out that individuals
make choices by
…developing
new
technologies,
cultivating new social relations,
creating new legal relations, critically
re-examining human consumption
patterns, needs, desires, and reevaluating and enlarging what passes
for human virtues.

3.3 Social Ecology
Social ecology challenges the mainstream
notion of „rationality‟ by describing current
society as “…a totally irrational society that
threatens to undermine the fundaments of life
on this planet” (Bookchin, 1980, p. 28). It is
suggested that since it is logically possible
for humans to achieve self-realisation
without averting serious environmental
damage, it is a matter of developing an
attitude that appreciates the intrinsic value of
nature (Holbrook, 1997, Bookchin et al,
1990). Consequently our ecological problems
can only be solved with a shift in mindset
(Holbrook, 1997, Bookchin et al, 1990). Such
an attitude can assist us in making „sensible‟
social action which has economic sense and
ecological sense in the long term.

Social ecology also includes “power,
authority and democracy” (Light, 1998, p.86)
and thus accommodates the complexities that
inform and shape the social aspect of an
ecological perspective. In this way, social
and the ecological insights are given equal
prominence and can inform each other.
Social ecologists reject the notion of
„antihumanism‟ and „biocentrism‟, which put
humanity against ecology. Instead, Bookchin
argued that nearly “all ecological problems
are social problems” (1989, p24) and that
radically separating social evolution from
natural evolution can only further alienate
humanity from the natural world “in which it
has always been rooted as a complex and
thinking life-form” (Bookchin, 1989, p. 23).
Social ecology is an approach to
environmental ethics that “does not seek to
destabilise anthropocentrism” (Andrew,
2000, p. 207). Social ecologists do not
challenge the notion of environmental
management; rather, it is the intention of
environmental management that social
ecologists seek to challenge. Environmental
management is seen by social ecologists as a
way to “exercise the powerful and privileged
status humans enjoy in the natural
community” (Schweitzer, 1935, cited in
Nash, 1990, p. 61).

In reference to the notion of „land ethics‟
Leopold, an environmental ethics pioneer,
suggested that the boundaries of community
need to include nature (Nash, 1990). He
proposed that in a sustainable society humans
and nature co-exist in a non-hierarchical
manner, and the idea of life community
extends far beyond traditional definitions
(Leopold 1933, cited in Nash, 1990).
Leopold approved the notion of responsible
“alteration, management and use” of natural
resources, and pointed out that humans have
the responsibility to take action to “prevent
the deterioration of the environment” (1933
cited in Nash, 1990, p. 71). Birkin (1996)
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A summary of the differences between
mainstream approaches and social ecology
approaches to the environment is provided in
Table 1. Briefly, social ecology explores the
role humans can play in achieving long-term
sustainability, where sustainability includes
social, ecological and economic aspects. In
other words, social ecologists challenge the
existing mainstream dominant ideology of
short-term, economic growth which is
unsustainable and which has been achieved at
the cost of nature (Geno, 1995; Andrew,
2000). As seen in Table 1, the
anthropocentric view implicit in mainstream
approaches is suspended by social ecology in
favour of a non-hierarchical relationship
between humans and the ecology. Therefore,
social ecology considers human survival as

According to mainstream approaches, the
role of accounting in society is integral to the
requirements of capital markets. By contrast,
social ecology considers humans to be
guardians of nature in order to protect the
needs of future generations. Accordingly, the
role of accounting is to facilitate and reflect
this custodial function. The focus of social
ecology of the economy must therefore be
long-term.
4. ACCOUNTING FOR EMISSIONS
RIGHTS AND SOCIAL ECOLOGY
4.1 Emission rights as assets
The reliance on market-mechanisms as
providing an adequate response to GHG and
their impact on climate change has raised
implications for environmental accounting
(Hopwood, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009).
Accounting does play an important role in
ecological crisis, however, whether or not
accounting becomes part of the solution or
part of the problem (Lohmann, 2009)
depends on how accounting standard setters
understand the „nature‟ of emission rights.
The IASB‟s withdrawal of IFRIC 3
“illustrates the problems faced by standard
setters as they explore the frontiers of
accounting” (Cook, 2009, p. 457). Based on
mainstream accounting, standard setters have
struggled to establish a workable standard.
The suggested accounting treatment of
emission rights, as an asset (IASB 2005),
however, appears to maintain the „businessas-usual‟ mindset rather than reflect any
cognisance
of
the
importance
of
environmental ethics.

Table 1: Comparison of Mainstream and
Social Ecology approaches to the
environment (adapted from Andrew
2000).
Ethical
MainSocial
premises
stream
Ecology
Ontological Anthropo- Nonfoundation centric
hierarchical
Nature
Externality Human‟s
equal,
essential to
survival
Role of
Maximise Nature‟s
human
personal
guardian to
utility
protect
intergenerational
needs
Economy
Short-term Long-term
focus
focus
Role of
Integral to To represent
accounting capital
nature
in society
markets

In applying the environmental ethics of social
ecology one can ask a new set of questions
which were not possible of a mainstream
paradigm. Consistent with mainstream
approaches, emission rights are essentially
pollution rights that an entity can trade to
allow GHG to be emitted. The monetary
benefits that an entity can generate from the
sale of emission rights lead to the treatment
of emissions rights as assets. However, a
„right‟ is problematic in a wider social and
environmental context. Table 2 provides a

being inextricably linked to nature‟s survival.
This view challenges mainstream thinking
about nature as being an externality.
Consistent with mainstream views, the role
of humans is to maximize their personal
utility (Chua, 1986), and a short-term focus
of the economy is inevitable (see Table 1).
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comparison between mainstream and social
ecology approaches to emissions rights.

the responsibility of humans. Hayward
(2007, p. 434) noted that
…patenting the monetary value of the
rights may not only take precedence
over any concern about the
environment, but may also serve to
distract policy-makers from pursuing
viable alternative approaches to
making the reduction.

A mainstream approach would view
emissions rights as assets to be controlled by
the entity. The capacity to sell these in an
ETS ascribes a „future economic benefit‟ to
the emission rights. Accordingly, the concept
of having a right to emit carbon pollution is
incongruous with social ecology. Clark
(2001, p. 435) pointed out that the idea that
humans can possess the right to pollute is
unacceptable and “absurd from an ecological
point of view”. Schweitzer suggested, the
powerful and privileged status humans take
for granted, does not entail “a right to
exploit” but rather, “a responsibility to
protect” (1935, cited in Nash, 1990, pp. 6162).

The focus on accounting for emissions rights
as assets has demonstrated the saliency of the
profit imperative, rather than an effective
action to reduce GHG emissions.
The intention of ETS is to „internalize‟
pollution costs and ultimately alter business
behaviour, that is “management strategy ...
philosophies and practices” (Buhr, 2007 p.
67) However, accounting for emission rights
as assets may not result in entities changing
their behaviour if it is not „efficient‟ for them
to do so. Therefore, the quest to reduce GHG
emissions to mitigate climate change may be
mere rhetoric to enable corporate profits to
be generated from ETS. The self-interestprofit-maximisation imperative upheld by
mainstream approaches to climate change is
evident in the following comments about
ETS by Birley (2008) from the European
Climate Exchange
…this scheme is allowing those who
change early to make money…you put
technology
on
top.
of
your
smokestacks that will stop. the carbon
from going into the atmosphere, you
can profit from it.

Table 2: Comparison of mainstream
approach and social ecology approach to
emissions rights
Mainstream
Social Ecology
Control: exclusive
Responsibility: humans
controlled by an
maintain position as
entity
„environmental
managers‟; nature
guardianship
Probable future
Long-term
economic benefits
intergenerational
or sacrifice (short
sustainability
term)
Only measurable
Non-monetary social
economic benefits
and ecological benefits
(gained and lost)
A result of past
Co-existence
transaction
prioritised

Yet, a firm does not have to be reducing
GHG emissions to be able to profit from an
ETS. While emission rights are seen as
having future economic benefits and
fulfilling the definition of an asset, polluters
could purchase emission rights and sell them
later when the price has been driven up by
the market. Therefore, recognising emission
rights as assets could produce outcomes that
undermine efforts to abate carbon pollution.

The earlier discussion of social ecology as an
approach to environmental ethics argued that
it is human responsibility to reduce GHG
emissions. If a responsibility to reduce
emissions is recognised from holding
emission rights, would it not behove a
reporting
entity
to
recognise
an
environmental obligation? Hayward (2007)
criticised ETS for focusing merely on the
right to emit. He argued that in the debate
over climate change, people tend to lose sight
of the fact that carbon emissions reduction is

4.2 Emission rights as liabilities
If emission rights are not assets perhaps they
should be recognised as liabilities. A
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reporting entity could recognise a liability to
fulfil an obligation to purchase rights in order
to be able to emit. However, this would still
signal a suspension of any environmental
ethics in the accounting treatment of
emission rights. Is it sufficient to recognise a
financial monetary obligation to be able to
pollute? Gibson (1996) suggests that it would
be more effective to control the source of
emissions, rather than charging for the
emissions when they are already in the air, an
“end-of-pipe approach” (Gibson 1996 p.
659). Unfortunately, recognising a liability
still upholds the self-maximising mindset of
mainstream approaches since the monetary
obligation „entitles‟ the firm to emit
pollution.

maximising mindsets to prevail, and this, we
argue will be at the expense of the
environment. Focusing on the accounting for
emission rights, a construct of ETS, has not
been resolved by the IASB so far. We have
seen this challenge as a reason to pause and
recognise that emissions rights is an
unprecedented issue which traditional views
of accounting are not well equipped to
address. Further, we argue that the claimed
objectives of ETS to abate GHG emissions
cannot be met if anthropocentric views
persist.
We have presented a social ecology view, an
approach of environment ethics, which can
offer insights into why accounting for
emissions rights as assets or liabilities would
undermine efforts to reduce GHG emissions.
Emissions rights when characterised as either
assets or liabilities, that is, seen as future
economic benefits or sacrifices are still
constructs within the control of entities
participating in an ETS. Reduction of GHG
emissions need not be achieved, since the
incentive of an ETS is to make profits on
trading. A social ecology approach is based
on the long-term survival of humans and the
environment. Seeking monetary benefits is
viewed as short sighted. We have argued that
the „nature‟ of emission rights can best be
understood in the light of social ecology
which keeps the environment and human
survival at the forefront. Social ecology, as
an environmental ethic, enables us, and
importantly, accounting standard setters, to
provide a foundation for re-examining the
„nature‟ of emission rights.

A social ecology approach to emissions
rights provides a challenge to the mainstream
approach to emissions rights accounting (see
Table 2). Emission rights whether viewed as
assets or liabilities, fall within the property
rights held by an entity and hence within
their exclusive control. A social ecology
approach suspends notions of control to
adopt notions of responsibility by humans as
environmental managers or guardians.
Rather than emission rights providing future
economic benefits or sacrifices, which
emphasises the short-term, a social ecology
approach emphasises the imperative of a
long-term
view
of
intergenerational
sustainability. From a social and ecological
perspective future benefits are non-monetary.
A mainstream view relies on a capacity to
measure reliably the economic benefits of
emission rights as a result of past
transactions. The „nature of emissions rights
from a social ecology approach, renders
measurement an inconsequential issue. It is
the co-existence of humans and the
environment which is significant.
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